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TRIPPING OVER TRIPS AND THE GLOBAL
HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC: LEGISLATION AND




There is an ongoing ethical and legal battle concerning the extent of
property rights granted over pharmaceutical treatments and medicines for
patients afflicted with life-threatening diseases that promises to have
extensive repercussions on the future definitions of international legal
standards and institutions. On the one hand, based on humanitarian and
ethical arguments, contenders defend the right to disregard intellectual
property rights' when it involves fighting an epidemic of global proportion
such as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS") caused by the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV").2 The rather compelling question
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1. Investing for life: meeting poor people's needs for access to medicines through
responsible business practices, ELDIS.ORG, http://www.eldis.org/go/topics/resource-
guides/health-systems/access-to-medicines-and-intemational-issues (last visited Oct. 04,
2011). "The World Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) impacts access to medicines both by globalising
minimum standards of patent protection and by providing key flexibilities for bypassing
intellectual property barriers while still providing some compensation to patent holders."
Id.
2. Infection with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) weakens the immune
system and leads to Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) by destroying
important immune system cells that fight disease and infection. What is HIV AIDS?,
AIDS.GOv, http://www.aids.gov/hiv-aids-basics/hiv-aids-101/overview/what-is-hiv-aids/
(last updated June 20, 2011). See generally Global HIV/AIDS at CDC, CENTERS FOR
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at the center of their argument is whether or not it is ethical to protect the
profit of pharmaceutical companies when doing so can endanger the lives of
millions of people worldwide. This question is often politically influenced
particularly in the underdeveloped world. Since launching an aggressive
program to fight HIV/AIDS in 1996, Brazil has been a pioneer in
challenging the property rights of pharmaceutical companies thereby
pressuring them to accept a humanitarian reasoning and reduce the
excessively high prices of their medicines.4
On the other hand, there is the pharmaceutical companies' position, which
is heavily anchored on strict intellectual property laws that grant exclusive
rights to their products. This position also calls on ethical values, for
example, when they argue that intellectual property laws provide the
incentive for the continuous research that makes possible the development of
treatments for the diseases that plague modem humanity.s According to this
argument, laboratories will not invest the billions of dollars6 needed to
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/globalaids/Global-HIV-AIDS-
at-CDC/default.html (last updated Aug. 9, 2010).
3. JEAN 0. LANiouw & MARGARET T. MACLEOD, COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP.
RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUB HEALTH, STATISTICAL TRENDS IN PHARMACEUTICAL
RESEARCH FOR POOR COUNTRIES 2 (2005), http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/
studies/LanjouwStatistical%20Trends.pdf.
4. Brazil's AIDS Program Wins Gates Award for Global Health, PHILANTHROPY
NEWS DIGEST (May 30, 2003), http://foundationcenter.org/pnd/news/
story.jhtml?id=34700033; see also Press Release, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation,
Brazilian National AIDS Program Receives 2003 Gates Award for Global Health (May
28, 2003), available at http://www.gatesfoundation.org/press-releases/Pages/brazilian-
national-aids-program-030528.aspx; Karyn Schwartz, Brazil: A Model Response to
AIDS?, PBS.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/global/generics-wto.html (last
visited Oct. 04, 2011).
5. Paul Belleflamme, Patents and Incentives to Innovate: Some Theoretical and
Empirical Economic Evidence, 13 ETHICAL PERSP. J. EUR. ETHICS NETWORK 267, 267-
288 (2006), available at http://www.ethical-perspectives.be/viewpic.php?LAN=
E&TABLE=EP&ID=974.
6. A November 2001 report by the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development
found that it costs a company an average of $802 million to get one new medication from
the testing stages to United States patients. John Kelly, Drug Development Process,
DAWNBREAKER MEDICAL, http://www.dawnbreaker.com/portals/medicalportal/drugs/
drugdev.php (last visited Oct. 04, 2011); see generally Drug Discovery and Development,
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research and develop medical treatments for those diseases, or perhaps even
discover a cure.7 The market price of a drug or treatment includes the cost
of production, the recovery cost of years of research necessary to develop it,
and the continuous research necessary for the development or improvement
of other medicines and treatments.8  Additionally, investments in the
development of new medicines are often considered high-risk investments
with doubtful return; pharmaceutical laboratories often spend fortunes in
research programs that simply do not reach a successful outcome.9 Finally,
receiving governmental authorizations for commercial distribution requires a
long testing period to assess the effectiveness and potential side effects of
the medication.10 All of these steps preceding the commercial distribution of
medications compound the operational costs of the pharmaceutical
companies and must be recovered ultimately through the commercial sale of
their products.
Thus, intellectual property laws provide incentives for research
laboratories and pharmaceutical companies to promote the development of
treatments and medicines." The protection provided by these laws
guarantees that pharmaceutical companies will have a chance to profit from
the product of their investment.12 Considering the high risk and long-term
investment that laboratories and pharmaceutical companies undertake,
pharmaceuticals that reach the consumer market are often prohibitively
Understanding the R & D Process, INNOVATION.ORG (Feb. 2007),
http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/1 59/rd brochure_022307.pdf.
7. See Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal
Governance Approach, 77 TEMP. L. REv. 401, 424 (2004).
8. Kelly, supra note 6.
9. See Drug Discovery and Development, Understanding the R & D Process, supra
note 6.
10. Development & Approval Process (Drugs), U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/default.htm (last updated Oct. 27,
2009).
11. See Aaron S. Kesselheim, Using Market-Exclusivity Incentives to Promote
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 363 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1855, 1855 (2010).
12. Id.
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expensive and inaccessible to the general public.'3 On average, it takes ten
to fifteen years to place a pharmaceutical drug in the consumer market.14
Moreover, if the patent period for a certain pharmaceutical drug runs for
twenty years, the companies that own the patent will have only about eight
to twelve years to recover their investment and continue investing and
developing newer treatments and cures.1
Legally, generic medications enter the market as soon as the replicated
drug's patent period expires. 16  This intermingled system of intellectual
property and patent rights granted to pharmaceutical companies is the
implied contract between society and those who invest in innovation. Yet,
diseases that have a large-scale impact on global health, such as HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, 17 and Malaria,' 8 have sparked debates on whether these
implied contracts are just and ethical, especially when increased costs and
13. Eric Kimbuende et al., Prescription Drug Costs, KAISEREDU.ORG,
http://www.kaiseredu.org/Issue-Modules/Prescription-Drug-Costs/Background-
Brief.aspx (last updated Feb. 2010).
14. Kelly, supra note 6.
15. Patents normally are taken out toward the end of the discovery phase of a new
medicine. Given the length of the development stage, the patent life remaining by the
time the product reaches the market typically is between 8 and 12 years, and often less.
The inventor therefore has only a limited time to recover research and development costs
and to make a profit before copies appear. MICHAEL L. BURSTALL ET AL., INST. OF MED.,
THE CHANGING ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 129 (1991), available at
http://www.nap.edulopenbook.php?recordid=1810&page=129.
16. A generic drug can enter the market only after the brand-name patent or other
marketing exclusivities have expired and FDA approval is granted. Greater Access to
Generic Drugs, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucml43545.htm (last updated Aug. 12, 2011).
17. Tuberculosis: A Global Emergency, NFID.ORG (Apr. 1999), http://www.nfid.org/
old1/content/factsheets/tb.html ("Tuberculosis (TB) is the number one single infectious
disease killer, taking nearly 3 million lives per year. So great is concern about TB that in
1993, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared TB a 'global emergency.').
18. Paul H. Lambert, Malaria-Global Impact, NOBELPRIZE.ORG (Dec. 9, 2003),
http://nobelprize.org/educational/medicine/malaria/readmore/global.html ("Malaria is by
far the world's most important tropical parasitic disease, and it kills more people than any
other communicable disease, except tuberculosis.").
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reduced accessibility to these treatments are a consequence. Ultimately, the
argument stresses that all those compounded costs are necessary and result
into extraordinary benefits for humanity as a whole.
This particular debate is important. First, it unveils the earliest major
disagreement between positions sustained by legal arguments of domestic
reach, as well as arguments based on international law, international trade
interests, and compelling ethical variables. Second, the contention is not
limited to divergent positions between Brazilian officials and pharmaceutical
companies; it has broader and important repercussions for a large part of the
world's population. Finally, because epidemics such as HIV/AIDS have
global implications, possible negotiated solutions for the disagreement
should be considered with global perspectives and humanitarian
repercussions.
This Note examines the conflicts between patent rights and ethics when
humanitarian values are at stake and argues for the implementation of
legislative reform in low, middle, and high income countries as essential to
the global fight against contagious diseases. This Note then closely
examines Brazil's decision to bypass patent rights in the name of
humanitarian and ethical arguments, and the cases for and against Brazil's
actions. Furthermore, this Note considers the legal ramifications
international agreements may raise in the future and the impact on the
laboratories that manufacture the pharmaceuticals needed in the fight against
contagious and life-threatening diseases.
II. THE GLOBAL HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC
A. The Current Status of the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic
According to the September 2010 progress report on HIV/AIDS
interventions in the health sector released by the World Health Organization
("WHO") in collaboration with The United Nations Children's Fund
("UNICEF") and The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
("UNAIDS", a total of 33.4 million people are living with HIV
worldwide. The same report discloses that in 2008 alone, 2.7 million
people were infected with HIV.20 Thus, access to quality prescription drugs
19. WORLD HEALTH ORG., TOWARDS UNIVERSAL ACCESS: SCALING UP PRIORITY
HIV/AIDS INTERVENTIONS IN THE HEALTH SECTOR, PROGRESS REPORT 2010 24 (2010)
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can mitigate the HIV global health crisis, which impacts a large segment of
the population.21 There is strong evidence that important gains have been
made towards the attainment of global universal access to anti-HIV drugs
and treatments, but considerable challenges remain.22 Universal access is
defined as providing access to HIV testing, prevention, treatment and care
23for at least eighty percent of the country's population in need. Some low
and middle income countries have successfully attained the universal access
eighty percent standard and "[f]or a good number of countries, universal
access is within clear reach by the end of 2010.",24 However, "on a global
scale, targets for universal access to HIV prevention, treatment and care will
not be met by 2010.",25 In addition, there is widespread concern that "the
[current] financial crisis and resulting economic recession have prompted
some countries to reassess their commitments to HIV programmes."26 As a
result of the financial crisis, funding for HIV services and international
assistance has not experienced the usual steady increase over the current
period and all the gains from the past several years risk being reversed.2 7
Thus, "[i]n the context of a global financial crisis, [the 2010 progress] report
underscores the urgency of continuing to mobilize support by countries,
donors and global agencies in order to respond to the HIV epidemic." 28
21. Sydney Rosen, Economic Outcomes ofHIV/AIDS Treatment in South Africa, BU
CENTER FOR GLOBAL HEALTH & DEV., http://www.bu.edu/cghd/projects/economic-
outcomes-of-hivaids-treatment-in-south-africal (last visited Oct. 04, 2011) ("A large body
of literature confirms the success of AIDS treatment programs in reducing viral load and
restoring the immune systems of adult patients in sub-Saharan Africa.").
22. WHO PROGRESS REPORT 2010, supra note 19, at 3.
23. Id. at 5.
24. Id. This report shows that, among 144 low and middle income countries
reporting program data this year, eight had already achieved universal access to
antiretroviral therapy at the end of 2009, providing treatment to at least 80% of patients in
need. Id. at 9. Furthermore, 15 countries had achieved the 80% target for coverage with
antiretroviral prophylaxis to prevent mother to child transmission of HIV. Id.
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On June 10, 2011, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS. 2 9 The declaration calls on all United
Nations Member States to redouble their efforts to achieve universal access
to HIV prevention, treatment, care, and support by 2015.30 According to the
United Nations Secretary-General, "2011 marks a unique opportunity to take
stock of progress and to critically and honestly assess the barriers that keep
us shackled to a reality in which the epidemic continues to outpace the
response." 31
B. TRIPS and the Impact on Universal Access Goals
Many governments around the world have granted their innovators and
creators rights over their inventions hoping to encourage and produce ideas
that benefit society.32 However, "[t]he extent of protection and enforcement
of these rights varied widely around the world; and as intellectual property
became more important in trade, these differences became a source of
tension in international economic relations." 33  The World Trade
Organization ("WTO") Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights Agreement ("Agreement"), negotiated in the 1986-1994 Uruguay
Round,34 established common international rules governing intellectual
29. Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS: Intensifying our Efforts to Eliminate
HIV/AIDS, G.A. Res. 65/277, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/277 (June 10, 2011).
30. Id.
31. U.N. Secretary-General, Uniting for universal access: Towards zero new HIV
infections, zero discrimination and zero AIDS-related deaths: Implementation of the
Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS and the Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS:
Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/65/797 (Mar. 28, 2011).
32. WORLD TRADE ORG., CHAPTER 2 THE AGREEMENTS: THE WTO is 'RULES-BASED';
ITS RULES ARE NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS 17 (2010) [hereinafter THE WTO IS 'RULES-
BASED'], http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/tif e/utwchap2_e.pdf.
33. Id. at 39.
34. The Uruguay Round was the 8th round of multilateral trade negotiations
involving 123 countries (contracting parties) that occurred from 1986 to 1994,
transforming the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") into the World
Trade Organization ("WTO"). Understanding the WTO: Basics, The Uruguay Round,
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis e/tif e/fact5_e.htm
(last visited Dec. 10, 2011).
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property rights and set the minimum level of protection that each
government must give to the intellectual property of fellow WTO
members.35 Of the 153 member states of the WTO , the top traders are the
European Union, the United States, Japan, and China. These countries are
also among the top producers and exporters of pharmaceuticals needed by
HIV/AIDS programs in underdeveloped and developing countries.
Before the WTO was created, two main international agreements of the
World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") existed: the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property governing, inter alia,
patents and industrial designs, and the Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works governing copyrighted material. 3 9 These
conventions did not encompass all areas of intellectual property and "[i]n
some cases, the standards of protection prescribed were thought
inadequate."40 Thus, the TRIPS Agreement "add[ed] a significant number
of new or higher standards."4 1
Furthermore, one of the basic principles of the Agreement is that
"intellectual property protection should contribute to technical innovation
and the transfer of technology. Both producers and users should benefit, and
35. Understanding the WTO: The Agreements, Intellectual Property: Protection and
Enforcement, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/
whatis e/tif e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Oct. 04, 2011) [hereinafter Understanding the
WTO IP].
36. Understanding the WTO: The Organization: Members and Observers, WORLD
TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tif e/org6_e.htm (last
visited Oct. 04, 2011) [hereinafter Understanding the WTO Members].
37. THE WTO 1s 'RULES-BASED,' supra note 32, at 53.
38. WORLD TRADE ORG., HIGHLIGHTS: MERCHANDISE TRADE BY PRODUCT 41 (2010),
http://www.wto.org/english/rese/statis-e/its2010_e/section2 e/itsl0_highlights2 e.pdf;
see also WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE WORLD MEDICINES SITUATION: CHAPTER 3
MEDICINES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 21-29 (2004), http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/
pdf/s6160e/s6160e.pdf.
39. THE WTO Is 'RULES-BASED,' supra note 32, at 40.
40. Id.
4 1. Id.
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economic and social welfare should be enhanced .... With regards to
patent rights, Article 27.1 of the Agreement provides that patents shall be
available "in all fields of technology,"43 and Article 33 provides for an
enforceable protection period of at least twenty years." In addition, Article
3145 of the Agreement permits governments to issue compulsory licenses
without authorization of the holder "under certain conditions aimed at
safeguarding the legitimate interests of the patent-holder.A 6  These
conditions include:
[T]he obligation . . . to grant such licences only if an unsuccessful
attempt has been made to acquire a voluntary licence on
reasonable terms and conditions within a reasonable period of time
. . . pay adequate remuneration . . . taking into account the
economic value of the licence; and a requirement that decisions be
subject to udicial or other independent review by a distinct higher
authority.
Thus, the compulsory license provision grants governments certain
flexibilities in interpreting the Agreement.48 However, many countries
voiced their concern with the inherent uncertainties in interpreting the
compulsory license provision and the lack of a clear delineation of the
allowances given to countries that choose to take advantage of the
provision.49 Another concern raised by many countries is the Article 31
42. See Understanding the WTO IP,supra note 35.
43. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 331 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], http://www.wto.org/english/
docs e/legal-e/27-trips.pdf.
44. Id. at 334.
45. Id. at 333-34.
46. Understanding the WTO IP,supra note 35.
47. Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/
english/tratope/trips e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Oct. 04, 2011).
48. Understanding the WTOIP,supra note 35.
49. Id.
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requirement that the use of compulsory licenses be "authorized
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market."50 This requirement
precludes developing countries that lack the financial and technological
means to manufacture needed pharmaceuticals domestically from importing
those pharmaceuticals.' In addition, some governments seek to "ensure
[that] patent protection for pharmaceutical products does not prevent people
in poor countries from having access to medicines-while at the same time
maintaining the patent system's role in providing incentives for research and
development into new medicines." 52
Moreover, in an attempt to clarify further the scope of TRIPS and the
compulsory license provision, the WTO released a statement in 2001 known
as the Doha Declaration aimed at "promoting both access to existing
medicines and research and development into new medicines."53 The Doha
Declaration "emphasizes that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not
prevent member governments from acting to protect public health."54
Paragraph 5.c recognizes that "[e]ach member has the right to determine
what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency, it being understood that public health crises, including those
relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can
represent a national emergency."55 Rather than the common misconception
that a state of national emergency must exist before a compulsory license
can be issued, the Agreement allows a country to bypass the Article 31
50. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 43, at 333.
51. Frederick M. Abbott, WTO TRIPS Agreement and Its Implications for Access to
Medicines in Developing Countries 22 (Commission on Intellectual Property Rights:
Study Paper 2a), http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/study-papers/sp2aabbott
study.pdf.
52. Understanding the WTO IP, supra note 35.
53. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and
public health of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2002) [hereinafter Doha
Declaration], http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/min0Ie/mindecl-trips
e.htm.
54. The Doha Declaration Explained: Trade-Related Aspects ofIntellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS), WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dda-e/
dohaexplained-e.htm (last visited Oct. 04, 2011).
55. Doha Declaration, supra note 53.
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requirement of negotiating a voluntary license, which can save valuable time
56
when a national emergency is declared. In either circumstance, the owner
of the patent rights still must be adequately compensated in accordance with
the scope of his or her ownership of the patent as provided by the TRIPS
Agreement.
III. THE BRAZILIAN STI/AIDS PROGRAM
In the early 1980s, when the first cases of AIDS were being diagnosed and
documented in Brazil, the nation's system of governance was shifting from a
military dictatorship to the democratic process.58 Thus, the political and
social circumstances in which AIDS and public health concerns emerged
made Brazil's response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic unique.59 The political
shift led to a re-organization of Brazil's public health system, the
establishment of the Unified Health System (Sistema Onico de Sahde,
"SUS") and the newly ado pted 1988 Constitution, which considered access
to treatment a legal right.6 Today, access to treatment is recognized as an
inalienable human right and specifically delineated in Title II Article 5 of the
Brazilian Constitution.
56. TRIPS and Health: Frequently Asked Questions: Compulsory Licensing of
Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
tripse/public health faq_e.htm (last visited Oct. 04, 2011).
57. Id.
58. Jane GalvAo, Invoking Rights and Ethics in Research and Practice, Brazil and
Access to HIVIAIDS Drugs: A Question ofHuman Rights and Public Health, 95 AM. J. OF
PUB. HEALTH 1110, 1112 (2005), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC
1449327/pdf/0951 I 10.pdf.
59. Id. at 1110.
60. Id. at 1112.
61. CONSTITUiQAO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] Title II art. 5 (Braz.), English
Translation, available at http://pdba.georgetown.edulConstitutions[Brazillenglish96
.html#mozTocd550508.
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Furthermore, Brazil is at the forefront of the global access to medication
62debate when it comes to HIV/AIDS. In Brazil, an estimated 730,000
people live with HIV.63 Moreover, only an estimated 190,101 of those
"seropositive"64 patients who have been positively diagnosed with HIV are
65being treated with antiretroviral drugs. Since the beginning of the global
HIV epidemic in the 1980s, there have been 544,846 positive diagnoses and
217,091 AIDS-related deaths in Brazil.66 Each year, the Brazilian Ministr77
of Health receives and documents 33,000 to 35,000 new AIDS cases.
Concern over this ominous public health crisis led to the institution of a
68
national STI ("sexually transmitted infection")/AIDS program in 1996.
62. MINISTRY OF HEALTH OF BRAZIL, WORLD HEALTH ORG., INNOVATIVE
MECHANISM FOR R&D FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: BRAZIL'S PROPOSAL 1 (2009),
http://www.who.int/phi/Brazil.pdf.
63. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., HIV/AIDS HEALTH PROFILE: BRAZIL 1 (2010),
http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/global health/aids/Countries/lac/brazil.pdf.
64. Jacqueline Matuza, What is HIV Seropositive?, EHow.COM,
http://www.ehow.com/about 5094950 hiv-seropositive.html (last visited Oct. 04, 2011).
("Serostatus is a word used to describe whether particular antibodies are present in the
body.. . . If someone is seropositive for HIV it means their body has been producing
antibodies for HIV, which can be detected with an HIV antibody test, the most common
type of HIV test used.").
65. WORLD HEALTH ORG., TOWARDS UNIVERSAL ACCESS: SCALING UP PRIORITY
HIV/AIDS INTERVENTIONS IN THE HEALTH SECTOR PROGRESS REPORT 56 (2009),
http://www.who.int/hiv/pub/tuapr_2009 en.pdf.
66. BRAZILIAN MINISTRY OF HEALTH, HEALTH SURVEILLANCE SECRETARIAT, STD,
AIDS AND VIRAL HEPATITIS DEP'T, TARGETS AND COMMITMENTS MADE BY MEMBER-
STATES AT THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY SPECIAL SESSION ON HIV/AIDS:
COUNTRY PROGRESS REPORT 13 (2010), http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2010/
brazil_2010_countryprogress report en.pdf.
67. Id.
68. Sexually Transmitted Diseases, MEDLINEPLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/
medlineplus/sexuallytransmitteddiseases.html (last updated Dec. 1, 2011) (HIV/AIDS is
a sexually transmitted disease (STD) or a sexually transmitted infection (STI) that one
can get from having sex with someone who is already infected with the virus). See also
Treatments for HIV & AIDS, AIDSMEDS.COM, http://www.aidsmeds.com/list.shtml (last
updated Sept. 16, 2011).
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Sustained by the Brazilian Ministry of Health with the objective of attaining
the universal access standard, this program guarantees free treatment to
those diagnosed with HIV/AIDS and has decreased AIDS mortality by
half.69 In addition, the program has provided pregnant seropositive women
with access to antiretrovirals 70 that help prevent transmission of HIV to the
newborn.71 Furthermore, treating HIV infections is a complex process
requiring the combination of at least three antiretrovirals, the so called
"AIDS cocktail," and the treatment itself calls for frequent and continuous
medical supervision to evaluate the patient's adaptations to the
antiretrovirals, possible side effects, or possible difficulties in continuing
72treatment. Treatment alone can be very costly and the Brazilian STI/AIDS
program primarily aims to: (i) reduce these expenses, (ii) increase the
general public's access to essential antiretrovirals, and (iii) increase the
medical supervision paramount to ensure successful treatment.73
In order to obtain the antiretrovirals required for their treatment program,
the Brazilian government threatened to issue compulsory licenses as
provided by a clause in the A reement during negotiations with international
pharmaceutical companies. Generally, the Agreement introduced
intellectual property rules into the multilateral trading system in "an attempt
69. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEv., HIV/AIDS HEALTH PROFILE: BRAZIL (2010),
http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/globalhealth/aids/Countries/lac/brazil.pdf.
70. What is HIV Antiretroviral Drug Treatment? Introduction to HI VIAIDS
Treatment, AVERT.ORG, http://www.avert.org/treatment.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2011)
("The aim of antiretroviral treatment is to keep the amount of HIV in the body at a low
level. This stops any weakening of the immune system and allows it to recover from any
damage that HIV might have caused already. The drugs are often referred to as:
antiretrovirals, ARVs, anti-HIV or anti-AIDS drugs.").
71. Nogueira SA et al., Successful prevention of HIV transmission from mother to
infant in Brazil using a multidisciplinary team approach, 5 BRAZ. J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES
78, 78 (2001), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11493413.
72. Treatments for HIV & AIDS, AIDS MEDS.COM, http://www.aidsmeds.com/
list.shtml (last visited Oct. 04, 2011).
73. Id.
74. Horace E. Anderson, Jr., We can Work it out: Co-op Compulsory Licensing as
the Way Forward in Improving Access to Anti-retroviral Drugs, 16 B.U. J. Sc. & TECH.
L. 167, 169 (2010).
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to narrow the gaps in the way these rights are protected around the world[,]
... bring them under common international rules[,]" and provide guidelines
for settling intellectual property disputes between members of the WTO.75
Within the Agreement, Article 8 §1 provides that "[m]embers may, in
formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures
necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and
technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with
the provisions of this Agreement." 76 Article 8 § 1 has been construed to
allow WTO member countries to override patent laws and produce reduced-
cost generic drugs during public health emergencies. 7 7 Article 8 §2 further
expounds that these appropriate measures "may be needed to prevent the
abuse of intellectual property rights by [patent] right holders or the resort to
practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the
international transfer of technology." 7 8  One example of an appropriate
measure is the May 4, 2007, Brazilian Decree 6.108, which provides for
compulsory licenses of patented medications for public, noncommercial use
in cases of "public interest."79 In turn, Brazilian Decrees 3.201 and 4.830
consider those items related to public health to be of public interest.so
Although those Decrees have broadened the scope of what is considered
to be public interest in compliance with and within the confines of the
Agreement, there is neither a clear definition nor a consensus as to what
75. THE WTO is 'RULES-BASED,' supra note 32, at 39; see also TRIPS Agreement,
supra note 43, at 330.
76. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 43, at 323.
77. Doha Declaration, supra note 53.
78. Id.
79. DECREE NO. 6.108, DE 4 DE MAIO DE 2007, Didrio Oficial da Unifto (May 4,
2007), available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil 03/ Ato2007-2010/2007/
Decreto/D6108.htm. This decree provides for compulsory licensing of patents for
Efavirenz, for reasons of public interest when meant for public noncommercial use. Id.
80. FOREIGN TRADE INFORMATION SYSTEM, SICE: TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY
MEASURE: BRAZIL 106 (2009), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/BRZ/
WTO/ENGLISH/WTTPRSl40 3 e.doc.
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constitutes a public interest.81 Furthermore, in issuing these compulsory
licenses the Brazilian government assumes significant risks, particularly, the
impact these compulsory licenses might have on the nation's reputation for
compromising intellectual property rights and the desirability level of
investments in pharmaceutical research.
In 1995, the American pharmaceutical company, Merck, conducted trials
of the AIDS drug Crixivan in Brazil and concluded that a combination of
antiretrovirals posed significant health benefits to those infected with HIV. 82
In light of those conclusions, activist groups sued Merck and the Brazilian
federal government for not providing combination therapy to all patients in
the trial-especially those patients in the control group that received a
placebo treatment-and pressured the Brazilian Ministry of Health to declare
that antiretrovirals would be provided at no cost to those who needed them.83
The response of the Brazilian legislature to the demand for access to
antiretrovirals resulted in Article 68 of Law No. 9.279/96, which adopted the
TRIPS compulsory license provision and allowed for compulsory licenses to
be issued when there is "non-exploitation of the object of the patent within
the Brazilian territory for failure to manufacture or incomplete manufacture
of the product, or also failure to make full use of the patented process." 84
However, The Office of the United States Trade Representative ("USTR")
argued that "Article 68 conflicted with Articles 27.1 and 28.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement which ensure non-discrimination in the protection of patents and
exclusive rights of patent holders."ss Thus, the United States filed a
81. Sol Picciotto, Defending the Public Interest in TRIPS and the WTO, in GLOBAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT (revised ed.,
Peter Drahos and Ruth Mayne eds., 2002), http://www.lancs.ac.uk/staff/lwasp/sp-
trips.pdf.
82. Martin Foreman, Brazilian Activists Win AIDS-Treatment Battle, PANOS
LONDON, AEGIS.COM (Sept. 17, 1996), http://www.aegis.com/news/panos/1996/
PS960901.html.
83. Id.
84. Lei da Propriedade Industrial No. 9,279, 14 de Maio de 1996, Title I Ch. VIII
Sec. III, [Brazil Industrial Property Law No. 9,279] COLLECTION OF LAWS FOR
ELECTRONIC ACCESS (May 14, 1996), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/
en/text.jsp?file_id=125397.
85. Richard Tren et al., Brazil's AIDS Program: A Costly Success, 1 HEALTH POL'Y
OUTLOOK 3 (2006), http://www.aei.org/files/2005/12/12/20051212_19367HPO I-
06_g.pdf.
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complaint against Brazil with the WTO86 but political pressure against the
United States government and widespread support for Brazil's approach led
the United States to withdraw the WTO case and opt instead for a separate
United States-Brazil Consultative Mechanism. 7 The United States-Brazil
mutually agreed upon solution communicated to the WTO panel states:
Without prejudice of the US and Brazil's different interpretations
of the consistency of Article 68 with the TRIPS Agreement, the
US Government will withdraw the WTO panel against Brazil
concerning the issue, and the Brazilian Government will agree, in
the event it deems necessary to apply Article 68 to grant
compulsory license on patents held by US companies, to hold prior
talks on the matter with the U.S. These talks would be held within
the scope of the US-Brazil Consultative Mechanism, in a special
session scheduled to discuss the subject.88
Regardless of this mutually agreed upon solution, the conflict between the
United States and Brazil was further exacerbated in 2003 when the Brazilian
Ministry of Health issued the first compulsory licenses for the antiretrovirals
Lopinavir/Ritonavir, Efavirenz, and Nelfinavir, patented by Abbott, Merck,
and Roche Laboratories to be produced at the Brazilian manufacturer,
Instituto Farmanguinhos.89 In compliance with TRIPS requirements, Brazil
asked Merck, Abbott, and Gilead Laboratories to grant voluntary licenses for
pharmaceuticals manufactured by these companies and required the
companies to transfer their technology to Brazilian drug producers for
domestic manufacturing.90 For example, when Brazil's Minister of Health
threatened to break United States manufacturer Abbott Laboratories' patent
on Kaletra ("Lopinavir"), "Abbott ultimately agreed to lower the price of its
medication by 46%-and distribute it free-of-charge to 163,000 of the
86. Dispute Settlement, Dispute DS199: Brazil-Measures Affecting Patent
Protection, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu-e/cases-e/
dsl99_e.htm (last updated Feb. 24, 2010).
87. Pharmaceuticals: United States Drops WTO Case Against Brazil Over
HIV/AIDS Patent Law, THE BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS (June 26, 2001),
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/brazil/bna06262001.html.
88. Id.
89. Tren et al., supra note 85, at 3.
90. Id. at 3-4.
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600,000 carriers of the HIV virus in Brazil." 91 Thus, Brazil's agreement
with Abbott lowered the cost of Kaletra ("Lopinavir") from $1.17 to 63
cents a pill, while still protecting the drug's patent. Currently, these
pharmaceutical companies continue to negotiate price reductions with the
Brazilian government hoping to reach a consensus that circumvents violation
of the companies' patent rights without undermining the need to provide
universal access to treatment.93
Brazil's aggressive negotiation tactics, however, could be extremely
damaging to Brazil's reputation for attracting pharmaceutical investments in
the long-run. According to Jorge Raimundo, president of the consultative
council of Interfarma (the Brazilian association for scientific research),
employment in Brazil's scientific research sector has dropped to about
20,000 from a total of 24,000 jobs in 1999 and annual investments worth
about $350 million have dropped to about $90 million; "the pharmaceutical
industry is becoming increasingly cautious about making new investments in
Brazil . . . [a]nd it will only create problems for attracting capital to
Brazil." 94 Moreover, the steep drop in employment and annual investments
are a result of the pharmaceutical industry's decreased confidence in their
ability to profit substantially from their investments in Brazil.95  Thus,
aggressive negotiations, aiming at lower prices and liberated patent
restrictions, often tip the scale in favor of Brazil at the expense of the
pharmaceutical companies. As a result, pharmaceutical companies would be
less inclined to invest in Brazil, consequently resulting in harm to the
Brazilian pharmaceutical industry as a whole.
91. Generic Drugs In Brazil Are a Hard Pill for Big Pharma to Swallow,




93. Amy S. Nunn et al., Evolution of Antiretroviral Drug Costs in Brazil in the
Context of Free and Universal Access to AIDS Treatment, 4 PLos MED e305, 1811
(2007), available at http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.
pmed.0040305.
94. Generic Drugs in Brazil, supra note 9 1.
95. Id.
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On the other hand, Michael Ryan, director of the Creative and Innovative
Economy Center of George Washington University Law School, suggests
that in reality Brazil has been moving in two directions on intellectual
property policy: "Although the federal government has pursued a hard line
in public against [intellectual property] rights, 'a quiet, little-noticed
revolution has been taking place over the past decade . . . [w]ith the aim of
increasing technology innovation in the marketplace and overcoming
debilitating institutional problems . . . . Furthermore, John Kilama,
president of the Global Bioscience Development Institute, suggests that the
Brazilian government should consider the long-term positive impact of
stronger intellectual property protection on the country's entire population
rather than focus on the short-term benefits for the poor alone: "[T]he
problem is how to get Brazil to use its enormous private sector, which is
very innovative, to create wealth that enables the poor to afford access to
drugs, instead of going out and making it difficult for Brazilian companies to
compete."97
IV. UNITED STATES PERSPECTIVE AND PATENT LEGISLATION
In the United States, intellectual property and patent rights legislation are
administered by Title 35 of the United States Code98 and Article 1 Section 8
of the United States Constitution which provides: "[T]he Congress shall
have Power to . . . promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . ."99 The United States
Congress, often encouraged and pressured by pharmaceutical giants, is a
keen advocate of stronger protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights. 00 Accordingly, the United States' policy on trade strongly
96. The Two Faces of Intellectual Property in Brazil, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON,
UPENN.EDu (Mar. 01, 2006), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=
1339.
97. Id.
98. 35 U.S.C. §§ 251-318 (2006).
99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
100. Andrzej Zwaniecki, Stronger Enforcement, Better Intellectual Property Rules
Needed: Free Trade Pacts Strengthen Protection of Intellectual Property, USTR says,
AMERICA.GOV (Apr. 27, 2007), http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-
english/2007/April/20070427173617saikceinawz0.8305628.html. See also U.S. to
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supports restricting the number of countries that have access to generic
exports from developed producer countries.'o0 In the United States' view,
developing countries that have sufficient manufacturing capacity such as the
Philippines, India, and China should not be eligible to import generics from
abroad.102  But, under the Agreement and the Doha Declaration, the
Philippines, India, and China can legally issue compulsory licenses and
produce lowest cost, standard quality generics. Furthermore, in order to
increase the entry of generics into low income countries, it will be necessary
to aggregate the markets of middle-income countries with large populations
and meaningful purchasing power.103 Thus, after the implementation of the
Doha Declaration, the United States government and the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America ("PhRMA") zealously campaigned
against the Doha Declaration and promoted other trade agreements that
minimized its effect on the Agreement.104
In 2003, the WHO amended a provision of the Agreement that "prevented
governments from licensing the production of generic versions of patented
drugs exclusively for export to countries unable to make the medicines."'o5
This amendment, the "Paragraph 6" system ("Par.6"), removed the domestic
market requirement that restricted issuing compulsory licenses solely for the
production of exported generics.106 In other words, the predominant part of
acquire stronger IP Laws, IP MENU: GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Oct. 14, 2008,
3:49 PM), http://www.ipmenu.com/news/2008/09/us-to-acquire-stronger-ip-laws.html.
101. Brook K. Baker, Health Gap On WTO Medicines Negotiations: DOHA Redux-
U.S. Enters New Phase of Bad Faith Bargaining, NE. U. SCH. L. & HEALTH GAP (July 3,
2003), http://www.healthgap.org/press-releases/03/070303_HGAPBPUSGWTO
para6.html. Baker writes, "22 U.S. and European pharmaceutical companies and three
trade associations [support] the position that any agreement should apply only to the




105. Little-used 'Par.6' system will have its day, WHO tells Intellectual Property and
Health Review, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.wto.org/english/
news e/newsl Oe/trip_26octl 0_e.htm.
106. Id.
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the produced generics had to go to the domestic market and only what was
left could be exported. 10 7 According to the WHO, "the 'Par.6' system will
become more important as newer HIV/AIDS medicines are needed in the
future ... to increase competition from generics" when developing countries
such as India and Brazil have introduced full patent protection in the
pharmaceutical sector.'08 In addition, the exported generic drugs cannot be
exported solely for commercial or industrial purposes and must be readily
identifiable by a unique packaging and coloring to prevent disruptions to the
pharmaceutical market in developed countries. 9 The purpose of the unique
packaging and coloring requirement for generic medications produced under
a compulsory license issued by an exporting country is to protect
pharmaceutical companies against diversion, by ensuring that generic
products are clearly distinguishable to customs authorities and other
pharmaceutical manufacturers.'
In 2003, the Bush administration created The United States President's
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief ("PEPFAR") recognizing the distribution
of generic medications as an effective strategy to fight the global HIV/AIDS
epidemic.111 According to the November 2010 PEPFAR Operational Plan,
Treatment priorities include: procurement of generic ARVs at over
80% of the value of all purchases, accommodating patients failing
first-line therapy by increasing the percentage of drug procurement
committed to second-line regimens in anticipation of phased-out
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Brook K. Baker, U.S. Latest Conditions on Paragraph 6- Illusory Humanitarian
Sales, NE. U. SCH. L. & HEALTH GAP (Aug. 19, 2003), http://www.cptech.org/
ip/wto/p6/healthgap08192003.html.
110. General Council, Implementation ofParagraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Decision of the General Council of 30 August
2003, WT/L/540 and Corr. 1 (Sept. 1, 2003), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips e/implempara6_e.htm; see also WORLD
HEALTH ORG., ANTI-DIVERSION MEASURES 27 (2011), http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/
pdf/s6159e/s6159e.pdf.
I11. U.S. PRESIDENT'S EMERGENCY PLAN FOR AIDS RELIEF (PEPFAR), FISCAL YEAR
2009: PEPFAR OPERATIONAL PLAN 44 (2010) [hereinafter PEPFAR Operational Plan
2009], http://www.pepfar.gov/documents/organization/124050.pdf.
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Clinton HIV/AIDS Initiative funding, and preparing for an
expected shift to a tenofovir-based first line regimen later in
2010.112
The implementation of PEPFAR greatly increased the amount the United
States government was spending on combating HIV/AIDS outside of the
United States with an increase to $6 billion in 2008 compared with $1.5
billion in 2003.113 Moreover, prior to the implementation of PEPFAR, most
financial expenditures towards HIV/AIDS occurred via bilateral agreements
between the United States and another country, such as the Mother-to-Child
Prevention Initiativel14 that continued and became part of PEPFAR.
Towards the end of PEPFAR's founding administration, the Obama
presidential campaign pledged to increase PEPFAR funding and President
Obama's first budget proposed $366 million for PEPFAR in 2010.116
However, there is widespread fear that the current economic funding will
significantly jeopardize PEPFAR funding.'17 In fact, many clinical research
centers in low income countries that partnered with the United States under
PEPFAR have already reported detrimental effects to their programs caused
by a lack of new funding.
As a result of the global economic crisis, the Obama administration and
USTR Ambassador Ron Kirk are advocating opposition to protectionist
112. Id. at 43.
113. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), AVERT.ORG,
http://www.avert.org/pepfar.htm (last visited Oct. 04, 2011) [hereinafter PEPFAR].
114. "Beginning with the President's Mother and Child HIV Transmission Initiative
in 2002, and then expanding with the launch of the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 2003, prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT)
has been a central focus of U.S. Government global HIV/AIDS efforts." Expert Panel on
Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV, PEPFAR.GOV,
http://www.pepfar.gov/pmtctpanel/index.htm (last visited Oct. 04, 2011).
115. PEPFAR Operational Plan 2009, supra note 111, at 106.
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economic policies that limit and restrain free trade.1 19 In the context of
intellectual property and patent rights specifically, protectionist provisions in
free trade agreements-such as strict intellectual property and patent
restrictions-benefit large pharmaceutical corporations and place an
economic burden on domestic companies by limiting their ability to compete
with unburdened companies abroad.120 Thus, in the long-run, protectionist
provisions can harm the domestic market rather than contribute to the good
of society as a whole.12 1
Furthermore, the current financial crisis has also emphasized the necessity
of obtaining lower cost generic medications. Several billion dollars of the
PEPFAR budget is allocated to purchase of HIV antiretrovirals but
PEPFAR's stringent requirement that all generic antiretrovirals must be
approved by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") further impedes
the availability of generic drugs to be distributed by the program.122
119. Jonathan Weisman, Obama, in Canada, Warns Against Protectionism, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 20, 2009, at A4, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB123504260038621641.html; see also Ambassador Ron Kirk, United States Trade
Representative, Remarks at the Georgetown University Law Center: Trade and the
Economic Agenda: Serving America's Families and the Global Recovery 3 (Apr. 23,
2009), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/documents/USTRKirk-GeorgetownSpeech
.pdf.
120. Stephen Spruiell, Protectionism-Tariffs, Subsidies, and Trade Policy,
GLOBALENVISION.ORG (Aug. 30, 2006), http://www.globalenvision.org/library/15/1211.
A policy agenda that seeks to maximize the number of tariffs and subsidies a government
employs is usually called protectionism. Id. See also Christopher S. Gibson,
Globalization and the Technology Standards Game: Balancing Concerns of
Protectionism and Intellectual Property in International Standards, SUFFOLK U. L. SCH.
FACULTY PUBL'NS (Aug. 2007), http://lsr.nellco.org/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1052&
context=suffolk-fp.
121. See Spruiell, supra note 120.
122. M. Asif Ismail, PEPFAR Policy Hinders Treatment in Generic Terms: Critics
say FDA approval rule has meant greater use of high-cost drugs at expense of helping
fewer patients, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (Dec. 13, 2006),
http://projects.publicintegrity.org/aids/report.aspx?aid=836. "Estimates released by
PEPFAR reveal that in 2004 and 2005, its first two fully funded years, the plan allocated
only about 5 percent of its overall ARV drug budget-less than $15 million-for generic
drugs." Id. "A key reason for that lies in PEPFAR's own rules: only ARVs approved by
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (or given tentative FDA approval through an
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However, by 2005, fifteen generic drugs received FDA and WHO approval
123
and were being distributed by PEPFAR. By 2007, seventy-three percent
of all antiretroviral drugs distributed by PEPFAR were lower-cost generics,
saving PEPFAR partners an estimated $64 million.124
Another area of debate between the United States and Brazil with regards
to HIV/AIDS funding began as a consequence of PEPFAR's funding
restriction against organizations "that do not explicitly state they oppose
prostitution," as part of the United States moral agenda.125 Because of this
"anti prostitution loyalty oath" as a precondition for funding, Brazil refused
$40 million of PEPFAR funds in 2005 in favor of "preserv[ing] its
autonomy on issues related to national policies on HIV/AIDS as well as
ethical and human rights principles."l 2  The Brazilian government and
many other organizations favoring a non-judgmental approach to funding
allocation have expressed concern that "adopting the PEPFAR [anti
prostitution loyalty oath] would be a serious barrier to helping sex workers
protect themselves and their clients from infection."l 27
Several international nongovernmental organizations, such as Oxfam and
M6decins Sans Frontibres, have lobbied for urgent reform in global patent
legislation and demanded changes to the worldwide system for selling and
distributing antiretrovirals.128 Those organizations have requested that the
United States government and international pharmaceutical companies in
expedited review process set up in May 2004) can be procured with the program's
funds." Id.
123. See PEPFAR, supra note 113.
124. The Power of Partnerships: Fourth Annual Report to Congress on PEPFAR,
PEPFAR, http://www.pepfar.gov/press/fourthannual-report/99738.htm (last visited Dec.
14,2011).
125. See PEPFAR, supra note 113.
126. Id. See also Sarah Boseley and Suzanne Goldenberg, Brazil spurns US terms for
Aids help, THE GUARDIAN (May 4, 2005, 19:00 EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2005/may/04/brazil.aids/print.
127. See Boseley and Goldenberg, supra note 126.
128. Oxfam, Brazilfights for affordable drugs against HIVIAIDS: Drug companies vs.
Brazil: the threat to public health, 9 PAN. Am. J. PuB. HEALTH 331, 331 (2001),
http://www.paho.org/English/DBUES/v9n5-TEMA-Brazil.pdf
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developed countries change their policies on medicines and patents to
increase availability and access to treatment for low income countries.129
More specifically, they have asked for the United States to "stop using ...
the threat of trade sanctions to oblige Brazil and other countries to institute
levels of intellectual-property protection that harm public health and
economic development."' 0  Moreover, Oxfam has particularly requested
that pharmaceutical companies "issue voluntary licenses to allow local
manufacture of these medicines by third parties, or should agree to sell them
at prices comparable to those of generic manufacturers, such as companies
based in India."l 31
V. THE PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REFORM
It has been suggested that, although highly successful, the approach of the
Brazilian HIV/AIDS program and Brazilian legislators will not work for
other countries unless there are similar cultural and economic situations.132
Rather than advocating a "Brazilian Model," some experts have argued that
"[e]ach country must fashion its own response in consideration of its own
peculiarities, economy, politics, and social and cultural values." For
example, sub-Saharan African countries have a much higher HIV prevalence
and a much lower per capita health care budget, and "[a] crucial element in
any successful [antiretrovirals] program is ensuring there are enough
sufficiently trained medical staff to treat patients . . . Brazil has 206
physicians for every 100,000 inhabitants. The ratio is far worse in sub-
Saharan Africa . . . ."'34 While the Brazilian approach can still be
considered and applied to developing countries with similar economic and
cultural structures, those countries with a different level of socioeconomic
129. Id. at 332.
130. Id.
13 1. Id.
132. Guido Carlos Levi & Marco Antonio A. Vitoria, Fighting Against AIDS: the
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status are likely to adopt their own unique and customized approach to the
HIV/AIDS epidemic. In 2001, United Nations member states met at the
United Nations General Assembly Special Sessions on HIV/AIDS and
agreed to:
Enact, strengthen or enforce as appropriate legislation, regulations
and other measures to . . . ensure the full enjoyment of all human
rights and fundamental freedoms by people living with HIV/AIDS
. . . in particular to ensure their access to, inter alia education,
inheritance, employment, health care, social and health services,
prevention, support, treatment, information and legal protection.135
In 2006, The United Nations General Assembly "emphasized that legal,
regulatory and political barriers in countries continue to block peoples'
access to effective prevention programmes" and called on parliaments to
enact legislation aimed at removing these barriers.1 36 The Assembly also
requested parliamentarians to "ensure that they pass national laws that allow
their governments to use existing global trade rules [such as the WTO's
TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration] to ensure access to affordable
HIV medicines." 37
According to UNAIDS, legislators in low, middle, and high income
countries can take significant steps to increase the availability of treatment
and support for their HIV/AIDS patients.'38 These steps include reforming
national intellectual property legislation and national patent laws, taking an
active role in trade negotiations, advocating increased bilateral budget
support, and opposing any provisions in bilateral, regional, or multilateral
treaties that create more extensive intellectual property protection and
135. JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS, TOOLKIT: SCALING UP HIV-
RELATED LEGAL SERVICES 11 (2010), http://data.unaids.org/pub/Manual/2010/
20100308revisedhivrelatedlegalservicetoolkitwebversion-en.pdf.
136. JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS, HANDBOOK FOR
PARLIAMENTARIANS: TAKING ACTION AGAINST HIV xi (2007) [hereinafter HANDBOOK
FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS], http://data.unaids.org/pub/Manual/2007/20071128_ipu
handbook en.pdf.
137. Id. at xi-xii.
138. JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS, HANDBOOK ON HIV AND
HUMAN RIGHTS FOR NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 17 (2007),
http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2007/jc I 367-handbookhiv-en.pdf.
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undermine the flexibilities inherent in the TRIPS Agreement.' 39 Thus,
UNAIDS has proposed a special approach involving legislative reform in
countries of differing levels of economic status.
A. Legislation in Low, Middle, and High Income Countries
In expectation of promoting access to affordable pharmaceuticals,
UNAIDS proposes legislative reform of intellectual property laws in low
and middle income countries to ensure that TRIPS flexibilities are
incorporated into the national laws of these countries, as recommended by
the United Nations General Assembly. 140 UNAIDS also proposes reform of
national patent laws in the least developed countries to "allow national
authorities the option of not providing any patent protection in the
pharmaceutical sector until 2016, as provided in the WTO Doha
Declaration."1 41  This framework will allow sufficient time for least
developed countries to take advantage of and implement the flexibilities
inherent in the TRIPS Agreement into their national laws. Moreover,
UNAIDS proposes that low and middle income countries "take an active
role in trade negotiations to ensure that governments do not enter into
regional and bilateral trade agreements that include intellectual property
provisions with more extensive patent protection than required by the TRIPS
Agreement."l42 Thus, low and middle income countries that actively
participate in trade negotiations can tip the scale in their favor and oppose
any overly stringent intellectual property provisions in bilateral or
multilateral agreements.
On the other side of the economic spectrum are the laboratories based in
high income countries that manufacture the pharmaceuticals required for the
success and effectiveness of HIV/AIDS programs in low and middle income
countries. For this reason, UNAIDS has requested that legislators in those
high income countries "ensure that trade sanctions are not threatened or
imposed by governments of low and middle income countries" and "oppose
any provisions in bilateral, regional or multilateral treaties that create more
extensive intellectual property protection than what has been agreed under
global trade rules or that undermine the flexibilities in the TRIPS
139. See HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, supra note 136, at 121-25.
140. Id. at xix.
141. Id
142. Id.
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Agreement."14 3  Therefore, UNAIDS recommends that high income
countries also take a stance against overly stringent intellectual property
provisions, and instead, opt for agreements allowing low and middle income
countries to take advantage of the flexibilities inherent in the Agreement as
provided by the Doha Declaration.
B. Proposed Legislative Reform-Legal and Political Ramifications
Whether the legislative reform proposed by UNAIDS will have the
desired results will substantially depend on whether it strikes a balance
between public health concerns and promoting innovation. However,
contrary to the UNAIDS proposal, governments of many low and middle
income countries are adopting stronger domestic intellectual property
legislation in conformity with "the mandates of 'free' trade agreements
signed with the United States."'" These agreements stipulate intellectual
property provisions that "extend beyond the patent law standards ... which
promised to balance the exigencies of public health and patent holders." 45
A possible explanation for why these countries are submitting to stronger
intellectual property legislation, for the sake of concluding trade agreements
with the United States, is provided in a statement by Dr. Margaret Chan of
the WHO: "[C]ountries unskilled in trade negotiations fear they will be
tricked or duped. . . fear they will be punished by trade sanctions imposed in
retaliation . . . [and] fear that pharmaceutical companies will use unfair
tactics . . . to reduce competition from lower-priced generics." 46 For that
reason, the UNAIDS legislative reform proposal's ultimate goal will also
substantially depend on whether low and middle income countries are able
to enter into trade agreements via more aggressive negotiations favoring a
broader representation of their need for lower-priced generics.
143. Id. at xviii-xix.
144. Arachu Castro et al., Access to generic antiretrovirals: inequality, intellectual
property law, and international trade agreements, 23 CAD. SAODE POBLICA, RIO DE
JANEIRO S85, S87 (2007), http://www.scielo.br/pdf/csp/v23sl/l0.pdf.
145. Id.
146. Margaret Chan, Access to Medicines: Pricing and Procurement Practices,
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VI. CONCLUSION
Assuming that every life-threatening disease is a humanitarian and ethical
concern and in taking that assumption to the extreme, one may conclude that
all patent rights must be violated. However, patent violations, particularly
under the protection or motivation of the state, might negatively affect
investment in research for new treatments and therapies. Supporters of
breaking patent laws in the name of ethical reasons-such as the avoidance of
a humanitarian disaster-make a valid point. Nevertheless, would it be
ethical and humanitarian to withhold from future generations the possibility
of a cure for life-threatening disease? There is no easy answer.
Although the pharmaceutical industry as a whole is not forthright about
how much profit is lost by the anti-intellectual property actions of some
countries, the more pressing concern is the absence of economic drivers for
pharmaceutical companies to make serious global health threats, such as
HIV/AIDS, a research priority. Given all of the controversy surrounding
HIV/AIDS drugs, pharmaceutical companies are more likely to fund
research for health threats that are less stigmatized, such as Tuberculosis,
Malaria and cancer. Companies might sense more incentive to invest and
engage in research for other diseases that are not as likely to lead to
controversy and threats to intellectual property rights and overall market
profit. One question that remains unanswered is why antiretrovirals, as
opposed to medications and treatments for other life-threatening diseases,
are at the center of so much controversy and dispute. This occurrence may
be due to the ease of manipulation of people with HIV, often
underprivileged and uneducated, and not because of a true global interest in
eradicating the virus and fighting AIDS.
To complicate matters further, in Brazil accusations abound of waste and
misuse of resources by the Brazilian Ministry of Health, often in the value of
hundreds of millions of dollars.14 7 To consider the intellectual property
system as the sole problem or reform to intellectual property laws as the sole
solution would exclude several other issues that also considerably impact
accessibility to pharmaceuticals. This issue seems to fall outside the legal
realm but needs to be taken into consideration when drafting legislation that
involves intellectual property rights.
Moreover, some pharmaceutical companies have used "compensatory"
policies and strategies to water down criticism. For example, Novartis's
147. Felicia Bryson, Brazil's SUS National Health Problems, THE Rio TIMES (Apr. 5,
2011), http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-politics/brazils-sus-national-health-
problems/.
TRIPS and the Global HIVIAIDS Epidemic
generous contributions and funding have allowed the WHO to provide and
distribute medications and treatments for patients with Hansen's disease
("leprosy") free of charge since 1995.148 According to official reports, the
global registered prevalence of leprosy stood at 213,036 cases at the
beginning of 2009 but fortunately, the disease is curable with the appropriate
medication and treatment.149  Thus, in this case, financial costs and
intellectual property rights are not interfering with accessibility and
availability of medical treatments.
Finally, this case suggests another complex paradox: Although, in
principle, acknowledging and conceding to intellectual property rights seems
to be aligned with obvious values and morals, this is an alignment far from
definitive. For example, employing defenses against bioterrorism or a
widespread pandemic would entail producing and providing large supplies
of a medication to a large number of people in the fastest, most efficient
method possible. The only way to satisfy such large and rapid demand
would be to increase the number of manufacturers by issuing compulsory
licenses. In this case, overzealous protection of intellectual property rights
would truly be trumped by a global necessity. A crisis situation-such as the
HIV/AIDS epidemic may be interpreted to be-can easily invoke the same
ethical and moral variables that trump any necessity to defend intellectual
property rights.
148. World Health Org., Leprosy (Hansen Disease) Report by the Secretariat, WHO
Doc. EB126/41 2 (Jan. 22, 2010), http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/
EB126/B126_41-en.pdf.
149. See Leprosy, Fact Sheet Vo. 101, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Feb. 2010),
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fsl01/en/. See also Maria A.B. Trindade et
al., Delayed Diagnosis of Multibacillary Leprosy: A Report of Eight Cases, 13 BRAZ. J.
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 155, 155 (2009), http://www.scielo.br/pdflbjid/v13n2/
v13n2al7.pdf ("more than 250,000 new cases were registered in 2007, including about
40.000 in Brazil and 140.000 in India").
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